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17 March 1965

OCI No. 0555/65

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTRIES ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY LIST

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Developments in Countries on the
Counterinsurgency List

1. Congo

Colonel Hoare's South Africans have finally started their long-delayed march from Bunia to close the northeastern frontiers. On 15 February, several of his "special platoons" deployed in the direction of Mahagi, on the Ugandan frontier. After that town's occupation--it will be garrisoned by Congolese--the mercenaries plan to push north on foot. Hoare thinks it will take them three months to reach Aba on the Sudanese frontier.

West of Stanleyville, rebel bands continue to give Congolese Army units a hard time. However, because of the insurgents' relative isolation in this area, their increasing loss of popular support, and lack of direct access to outside military supply, it seems unlikely that their efforts will seriously threaten the government's over-all strategic position.

The situation in the Fizi region on Lake Tanganyika remains tense. Morale of government troops north of Albertville is low and large numbers of rebels are said to be concentrating at Fizi. Shipments of arms across the lake from Kigoma in Tanzania reportedly are increasing. The Congolese Government is fitting out two 150-ton patrol boats at Albertville, and these will be put into operation shortly. Their presence on the lake may discourage arms smuggling from Tanzania, which has become relatively blatant.

Uganda, meanwhile, appears to be muting its involvement in the Congolese conflict. Most indications in the field point to the withdrawal of Ugandan

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troops from the Congo. In an interview on 15 March with a US newsmag in Kampala, Prime Minister Obote admitted that Uganda had aided the rebels hitherto, but that "nobody now will use Uganda for arms shipments." Whether Obote will keep his promise is open to question, but the statement reflects the unpopularity in Uganda of his involvement in the Congo.

2. Congo (Brazzaville)

The Brazzaville regime continues to seek support among African radicals for strengthening its military capability in the face of an attack it fears from Leopoldville. An Algerian AN-12 arrived in Brazzaville on 3 March with 18 Algerian guerrilla specialists and a heavy cargo. Egypt has sent five doctors as well as 25 advisers who are reportedly training a Congolese paracommando company.

Five Soviet military advisers reportedly are instructing Congolese in the use of heavy machine guns and possibly of radio equipment. A Soviet ship called at Pointe Noire in late January and,

offloaded 100 tons of arms. Although such a delivery might be earmarked for pro-Communist Angola rebels or even anti-Tshombé Congo rebels, it seems likely that Brazzaville would keep any military equipment arriving at this time.

Two Chinese officers are training Congolese NCOs in the use of Russian light weapons. Approximately 200 Chinese Communists are reported to be in the country, including at least 10 military officers as well as civilian technicians and dependents.

3. Sudan

Dissident activity in the southern Sudan has recently intensified, and peaceful integration of the Negroid south and the Arab north seems as far away as ever. Additional northern army units reportedly will be sent to the southern command within a few weeks to deal with the stepped-up insurgency.

A north-south peace conference finally convened in Khartoum on 16 March. The Sudan African National Union (SANU), itself divided by internal frictions, reluctantly agreed to participate in the meeting

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after northern leaders announced that they intended to deal with former SANU members who are now acting as northern puppets. As the northerners apparently feel that they have the upper hand, however, and are likely to adopt a rigid stance in the negotiations, the talks will almost certainly fall apart before any compromise can be obtained.

The new cabinet in Khartoum is dominated by the non-Communist UMMA and National Union parties. The Communists' strength has been seriously eroded, partly as a result of their continuing refusal to participate in the government and also by the defection of various trade unions and professional groups from the leftist camp. The government, however, is still reluctant to make any drastic policy shifts which might provoke further conflicts with the leftists and is still offering at least verbal support for the Congolese rebel movement. Continued collaboration between the Sudanese forces and Congolese rebels in the south will almost certainly provoke further attacks from the SANU rebels, who have condemned such support.

4. Iraq

The Iraqi Government is making extensive preparations to renew its war against the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. Army units are being moved north, strategic outposts are being reoccupied, and army elements already in Kurdistan have been alerted and told to take increased precautions against possible Kurdish action. The Kurds, observing these actions, are convinced that the government expects to renew the fighting shortly and are apparently making preparations of their own for a resumption of the conflict.

The government will probably have its forces in place sometime between 20 March and the first of April. Once this has occurred, Baghdad apparently plans to issue a final ultimatum to the Kurds, offering them very limited concessions which will fall far short of the Kurdish demand for a large degree of autonomy in Kurdistan. The Kurds are certain to reject the Baghdad ultimatum, and hostilities are likely to begin some time in early April.

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The Kurds have had a 14-month period of cease-fire in which to rest, regroup, and lick their wounds since the last round of extensive fighting, and are presumably primed for a renewal of the conflict. They are unlikely to be overwhelmed in the guerrilla warfare that has characterized previous rounds in the four-year-old rebellion, but the Iraqi Army is certainly capable of inflicting considerable property damage in Kurdistan, as it did in the summer of 1963.

The government apparently is resolved to make a major effort again. Behind-the-scenes infighting within the regime between militant nationalists who oppose any substantive concessions to the Kurds and pro-Nasirists who, following Cairo's lead, have been urging a compromise settlement of the Kurdish issue has evidently been decided in favor of the militants.

5. Laos

The Communists are continuing to exert pressure against government positions in widely scattered areas of Laos. Northeast of the Plaine des Jarres, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces are persisting in their efforts to consolidate control over the region between Sam Neua and Ban Ban. Government units in the area are putting up good resistance, however, and the Meo guerrillas are particularly effective in countering the Communist advances.

Farther south, the Communists have stepped up their activity east of Savannakhet. Last week, Communist troops in estimated battalion strength mounted a raid against Dong Hene, a government position about 40 miles east of Savannakhet. Although the raiders were repulsed and heavy losses were inflicted by the T-28s of the Laotian Air Force, they succeeded in destroying a key bridge on Route 9 just east of the town. This loss will hamper overland resupply of government forces positioned farther to the east when the rainy season arrives.

6. Colombia

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Another episode in the Simacota affair is the arrest of a congresswoman who bought newspaper space for a message of congratulations to the "heroic" ELN raiders. She is charged with committing an unlawful act known as "apologia for a crime."

Meanwhile, a new wave of violence that began last December seems to have intensified. In addition to murder and banditry, there has been an increasing incidence of kidnappings for ransom, particularly in rural areas. Earlier in the year most victims were adults, but recently teen-age and younger children have been taken.

On 8 March there were kidnappings in both Medellin and Bogota. A series of telephoned threats to Bogota police that "gardeners of the ELN" were preparing to "plant bombs" set the stage for a police raid on a terrorist center which netted six persons engaged in manufacturing bombs and Molotov cocktails. Also confiscated was a packet of propaganda material designed for radio transmission. Bogota authorities so far have no good clues on how this material was to have been used.

In the state of Huila, heretofore a relatively peaceful area, authorities seized a shipment of contraband ammunition in a store in Campoalegre, raided the Communist Party offices in Neiva, arrested three students for painting subversive slogans on walls, and issued a statement to the press claiming that all subversive movements in the state were directed from Bogota.

7. Guatemala

The state of siege imposed on 24 February apparently has not improved the Peralta regime's ability to cope with subversives.

Subversive

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groups may well react as they did after a more successful raid in early December by stepping up their activities in defiance of the government.

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In Guatemala, prospects for united opposition have improved since the imposition last month of a state of siege which prohibits all political activity.

8. Honduras

The Honduran Communist Party (PCH) is reportedly ready to resume guerrilla operations after a six-month lull.

In late February, the Communist Popular Action Front (FAP) was beginning to organize its guerrilla units and was assembling them in the mountains of the northern departments of Yoro and Atlantida (see Map).

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Carefully selected members of the dissident faction of the Liberal Party were scheduled to begin receiving guerrilla training from the PCH in early March. As their training is completed the Liberals are to join the guerrilla bands already in the mountains.

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The current political unrest and the recent removal of air force chief Escalon and other high-ranking air force officers provides an opportune time for a renewal of guerrilla and insurgent activities.

On 10 March, a 14-man guerrilla band attacked the Rio Lindo Hydroelectric Plant, about 80 miles northwest of Tegucigalpa. Five of the attackers were killed, as were two soldiers guarding the plant, but the plant was not damaged.

9. Venezuela

Sporadic insurgent activity continues in mountainous regions on the north coast. Guerrillas of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) last month divided their time more or less equally between fighting the army and stealing supplies from isolated villages.

Rumors of military dissatisfaction with the administration of President Leoni and coup plotting are once again circulating in Venezuela, but still do not ring sound. Spokesmen of both the administration and the military establishment have denounced such rumors as falsehoods circulated by dissidents for political purposes.

A prominent publishing chain is waging a relentless war against the administration in its newspapers and magazines, and may indeed be promoting clandestine antigovernment actions.

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10. No significant developments of a counterinsurgency nature have been reported regarding Burundi, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Cambodia, Thailand, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, or Peru.


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